

## Message Text

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S E C R E T STATE 179090

FOR AMB YOUNG FROM UNA

FOLLOWING REPEAT KHARTOUM 3091 ACTION SECSTATE INFO USUN NEW YORK DATED JULY 12, 1978.

QUOTE : S E C R E T KHARTOUM 3091

DEPT PASS OTHER INTERESTED POSTS AS DESIRED

E.O. 11652: XGDS-4  
TAGS: XA, MARR, PORG  
SUBJ: PRE-OAU SUMMIT CONSULTATIONS WITH PRESIDENT NIMEIRI

REF: STATE 171696

1. I SPENT AN HOUR AND FORTY-FIVE MINUTES WITH PRESIDENT NIMEIRI ON JULY 11, THE LONGEST HEAD-TO-HEAD CONVERSATION I HAVE HAD SINCE I HAVE BEEN HERE. I OPENED BY REVIEWING POINTS SET FORTH IN REFTEL IN DETAIL. NIMEIRI'S FIRST REMARK WAS TO SAY THAT HE LIKED THE MESSAGE VERY MUCH, AS IT CONTAINED A LOT OF POSITIVE POINTS. THROUGHOUT MY PRESENTATION, HE NODDED HIS HEAD IN AGREEMENT AT VARIOUS TIMES.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 179090

2. ANGOLA-ZAIRE. NIMEIRI SAID U.S. STRATEGY IN THIS DISPUTE COINCIDED EXACTLY WITH SUDANESE POLICY. WAR WOULD NOT SOLVE THIS PROBLEM. ANGOLA AND ZAIRE WERE TWO OF THE LARGEST COUNTRIES IN AFRICA AND STABILITY IN BOTH WAS NEEDED BY ALL AFRICANS. HE LIKED THE IDEA OF RECIPROCAL STEPS TO REDUCE TENSIONS. HE SAID ONE OF PROBLEMS WAS THAT ANGOLANS BELIEVED MOBUTO COVETED

CABINDA. HE WAS GOING TO GIVE STRONG SUPPORT TO SUGGESTION OF LIBERIAN PRESIDENT TOLBERT AS MEDIATOR. TOLBERT HAD DONE AN OUTSTANDING JOB AS MEDIATOR AMONG THE FRENCH-SPEAKING WEST AFRICAN STATES. MOREOVER, TOLBERT WOULD SUCCEED NIMEIRI AS OAU CHAIRMAN. NIMEIRI WENT ON TO STATE, THAT IN LINE WITH HIS OPENING SPEECH, SUDAN WAS GOING TO PROPOSE THAT A STANDING COMMITTEE OF OAU VICE PRESIDENTS BE SET UP TO WORK, BETWEEN SUMMITS, SOMEWHAT ALONG THE LINES OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. TOLBERT WOULD BE ONE OF THOSE VICE PRESIDENTS.

3. NAMIBIA. NIMEIRI SAID THIS WAS A VERY DIFFICULT ISSUE. ALL THE AFRICAN MINISTERS HE HAD THUS FAR MET HAD SAID THEY HAD LOST CONFIDENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA'S GOOD FAITH. THEY SAY THE ONLY SOLUTION WAS BY ARMS. THE SUDAN WAS TRYING TO PREVENT THIS. A RESORT TO ARMS WOULD PRESENT AN OPPORTUNITY FOR FOREIGN INTERVENTION. THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS WOULD DOUBTLESS GET INTO IT, AND THEN THE WEST MIGHT HAVE TO INTERVENE. MOREOVER, BY AFRICAN STANDARDS, SOUTH AFRICA WAS A GREAT POWER. A WAR IN NAMIBIA WOULD BE A REAL WAR, NOT GUERRILLA SKIRMISHING AS IN RHODESIA. SUDAN BELIEVED THAT THE PROPOSAL OF THE WESTERN CONTACT GROUP WAS A GOOD BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND HOPED THE LUANDA MEETING WOULD SUCCEED. IT WOULD HELP IF SOUTH AFRICA STARTED SOME TROOP WITHDRAWALS. NIMEIRI SAID HE COUNTED ON USG

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 179090

HELP IN DETERRING THE SOVIETS AND THE CUBANS IF IT LOOKED AS THOUGH THEY WERE ABOUT TO INTERVENE.

4. RHODESIA. NIMEIRI OPENED THIS PORTION OF CONVERSATION BY STATING THAT SUDANGOV HAD REFUSED TO ADMIT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ZIMBABWE LEADERS WHO WERE PARTICIPATING IN THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT. HE SAID SUDAN WAS NOT AGAINST THEM, BUT SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS MILITATED AGAINST THE ADMISSION OF GROUPS NOT RECOGNIZED BY THE OAU. SUDAN HAD ALSO EXCLUDED REPRESENTATIVES OF POLISARIO, AND CANARY ISLANDS FOR SAME REASON. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, SAID NIMEIRI, THINKS IT CAN WIN MILITARILY, BUT HE AGREED WITH USG THAT IT WOULD DESTROY THE COUNTRY. NIMEIRI SAID HE HAD CAREFULLY STUDIED THE TALKING PAPER MY BRITISH COLLEAGUE AND I HAD SUBMITTED. SUDAN WAS TALKING TO THE FRONT LINE STATES, URGING THEM NOT TO ESCALATE THE GUERRILLA WAR. THIS WAS AGAINST THEIR OWN INTERESTS. SUDAN FELT US-UK PROPOSALS WERE A GOOD BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. NIMEIRI REITERATED SUSPICIONS VOICED BY FRANCIS DENG TO DAS DALLEY AND MS. HOLLOWAY THAT BRITISH WERE NOT TRYING AS HARD AS THEY COULD.

5. AFRICAN PEACE FORCE. NIMEIRI NOTED THAT IN HIS OPENING SPEECH, HE HAD NOT RECOMMENDED A PEACE FORCE. HE HAD SUGGESTED THAT OAU DISCUSS AN AFRICAN MODALITY TO DETER ARMED CLASHES. SUDAN WAS GOING TO PROPOSE THAT A PLANNING OFFICE BE ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE OAU. THAT OFFICE WOULD, WHEN NECESSARY, CALL ON INDIVIDUAL AFRICAN COUNTRIES TO SUPPLY LIMITED NUMBERS OF TROOPS. SUCH TROOPS WOULD SERVE AS A SYMBOL OF AFRICAN DETERMINATION AGAINST HOSTILITIES RATHER THAN A MILITARY DETERRENT. THIS PLANNING OFFICE WOULD, IN CASE OF NEED, ELICIT ASSISTANCE FROM FRIENDLY NON-AFRICAN COUNTRIES. IT MIGHT, FOR EXAMPLE, ASK THE USG FOR TRANSPORT OR SUPPLIES. NIMEIRI SAID HE HAD ALREADY CHANGED BASIC MISSION DOCUMENT OF SUDAN ARMED FORCES TO INCLUDE PARTICIPATION IN MISSIONS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 179090

ON BEHALF OF THE UN, THE OAU, AND THE ARAB LEAGUE.

6. FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN AFRICA. NIMEIRI SAID OAU WOULD PROBABLY PASS ANOTHER RESOLUTION DECRYING FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN AFRICA. TROUBLE WAS THAT MODERATES BELIEVED THIS INCLUDED SOVIET AND CUBAN INTERVENTION. "PROGRESSIVES" DID NOT. SUDAN HOPED FOR US SUPPORT IN MOBILIZING AFRICAN AND WORLD OPINION AGAINST SOVIET AND CUBAN PRESENCE. SUDAN FIGURED THAT THERE WERE 50,000 SOVIETS/CUBANS IN 13 AFRICAN COUNTRIES. THEIR TECHNICIANS WERE ALL RIGHT, BUT NOT THEIR MILITARY.

7. CHAD. NIMEIRI PLACED ENTIRE BLAME FOR BREAKDOWN OF TRIPOLI CONFERENCE STRICTLY ON THE SHOULDERS OF CHAD FOREIGN MINISTER. THE MEDIATION HAD BEEN GOING WELL, AND THEY WERE ON THE VERGE OF AGREEMENT. SUDANESE WERE THEN ASTONISHED THAT CHAD FONMIN REFUSED TO TALK ABOUT ANYTHING OR DISCUSS THE PEACE PLAN. SUDANESE HAD TAKEN THE LINE THAT THERE COULD BE NO DEPARTURE OF THE FRENCH UNTIL THE REBELS LAID DOWN THEIR ARMS AND ACCEPTED A CEASE-FIRE TO BE POLICED BY, INTER ALIA, SUDAN. NIMEIRI SAID THAT SUDAN WAS GOING SLOWLY BUT SURELY TO DIMINISH LIBYAN INTERFERENCE IN CHAD. LIBYANS HAD STARTED TO UNDERSTAND THE DANGERS OF THE SITUATION. THE CHADIANS NOW SEEMED TO WANT TO FIGHT. NIMEIRI SAID HE PLANNED TO TALK TO MALLOUM NEXT WEEK. HE WOULD LIKE TO TALK TO QADDAFI ALSO, BUT BELIEVED THAT LATTER WAS "AFRAID" TO COME TO KHARTOUM. NIMEIRI SAID HE BELIEVED MENGISTU MIGHT ALSO FINESSE ATTENDANCE AT THE SUMMIT.

8. ERITREA AND CUBANS. NIMEIRI SAID THE ETHIOPIANS WERE PUSHING THE SOVIETS AND THE CUBANS TO ENTER THE BATTLE IN ERITREA. CUBANS AND SOVIETS HAD SAID PUBLICLY

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 179090

THAT THEY WOULD NOT, BUT BOTH WERE MILITARILY PRESENT IN ERITREA. NIMEIRI SAID HE BELIEVED REASON THEY WERE NOT ATTACKING WAS THAT THERE WERE NO SUITABLE TARGETS AS YET IN WHAT WAS STILL A GUERRILLA WAR. NIMEIRI THEN ASKED FOR USG TO USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH ITS AFRICAN FRIENDS TO BUILD SUPPORT FOR AN OAU RESOLUTION URGING THAT CUBA BE EXPELLED FROM THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT. CUBA, SAID NIMEIRI, WAS PROBABLY THE MOST ACTIVE MEMBER OF THE WARSAW PACT. A COLLECTIVE OAU RESOLUTION IN KHARTOUM WOULD BE HELPFUL SUBSEQUENTLY IN BELGRADE.

9. OAU ORGANIZATION. NIMEIRI SAID SUDAN WOULD AGAIN SUPPORT RESOLUTION THAT OAU HQ BE MOVED OUT OF ADDIS ABABA. SUDAN HAD PROPOSED THIS LAST YEAR AT LIBREVILLE, BUT HAD BEEN HAMPERED BECAUSE IT COULD NOT PROPOSE AN ALTERNATIVE SITE. NOW TWO COUNTRIES, TOGO AND LIBERIA, HAD COME FORWARD WITH OFFERS TO HOST THE OAU HQ. SUDAN WOULD, HOWEVER, GET ANOTHER COUNTRY TO SPONSOR THE PROPOSAL. OTHERWISE ETHIOPIANS WOULD THINK THAT SUDAN WAS ACTING FOR ANTI-ETHIOPIAN REASONS. SUDAN'S REAL CONCERN WAS SECURITY FOR OAU HQ. SUDAN WOULD VOTE TO REPLACE ETEKI AS OAU SECRETARY GENERAL. SUDAN HAD NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER TO VOTE FOR CANDIDATE FROM ZAMBIA, ZAIRE, TO TOGO, BUT THEY WOULD VOTE AGAINST ETEKI. SUDAN ALSO WANTED TO CHANGE THE SECRETARIAT. THEY WANTED TO PUT A SUDANESE INTO A POSITION OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL SO THAT HE COULD ASSIST NIMEIRI DURING HIS YEAR AS CHAIRMAN. NIMEIRI SAID HE HAD SUDAN'S PRESENT AMBASSADORS TO JORDAN OR TO SWEDEN IN MIND FOR THIS JOB.

10. SOMALIA. NIMEIRI HAD SEEN SOMALI FOREIGN MINISTER JUST BEFORE RECEIVING ME. HE SAID FONMIN HAD REPORTED THAT SOVIETS, CUBANS, ETHIOPIANS, AND SOUTH YEMENIS WERE REQUISITIONING CATTLE AND FOOD FROM OGADEN INHABITANTS. FONMIN ALSO SAID THAT WSLF HAD TAKEN SOVIET AND CUBAN

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 179090

PRISONERS. ETHIOPIANS WERE BOMBARDING SOMALI VILLAGES IN RETALIATION FOR THIS. I SAID THAT AS FAR AS USG RELATIONS WITH SOMALIA WERE CONCERNED, WE WERE STILL FACING THE PROBLEM WE HAD DISCUSSED DURING THE VIISIT OF DAS HARROP AND HORMATS. SIAD BARRE SAID HE HAD STOPPED ALL ASSISTANCE TO WSLF BUT THERE WAS CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THIS WAS NOT SO. NIMEIRI EXPRESSED

SURPRISE SAYING THAT SOMALI FONMIN HAD JUST ASSURED HIM  
THAT WSLF WAS ACTING COMPLETELY ON ITS OWN, HAVING  
AMASSED A CONSIDERABLE STOCK OF WEAPONS ("MORE THAN  
THE INVENTORY OF THE SOMALI REGULAR ARMY") AND HAVING  
BEEN WELL TRAINED DURING THE MAJOR OPERATIONS IN OGADEN.  
NIMEIRI SAID THAT IF USG WANTED TO GIVE HIM SOME  
EVIDENCE OF SAID BARRE'S CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR WSLF,  
HE WOULD FACE SIAD BARRE WITH IT WHEN HE SEES HIM  
NEXT WEEK.

11. COMMENT: IF FOREGOING IS ANY INDICATION,  
IT LOOKS AS THOUGH WE MIGHT HAVE A COMFORTABLE YEAR  
WITH NIMEIRI AS OAU CHAIRMAN. MOREOVER, WHILE FOR  
TACTICAL REASONS, NIMEIRI HAS MUTED HIS PUBLIC  
OPPOSITION TO THE SOVIETS AND THE CUBANS, FEAR OF  
THEM IS STILL A BASIC DETERMINANT OF HIS AFRICAN POLICY.  
BERGUS UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

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## Message Attributes

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